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IDENTIFYING TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT AREAS THAT AFFECT PERFORMANCE TO
INCREASE PROJECT EFFICIENCY
Salome Saliashvili
University of Alabama in Huntsville, United States, salome.s@uah.edu
J. Daniel Sherman*, William I. Mackenziet
As space agencies around the world develop plans for scientific and technological advancement they must
concurrently manage contracting budgets and other resource constraints. To increase efficiency in space programs
some key issues must be addressed in future project management. Three semi-retired senior NASA test laboratory
directors, J. C. Blair, R.S. Ryan, and L.A. Schutzenhofer, have identified key technical management issues based on
their combined experience that dates to the beginning of NASA. In interviews with these three senior technical
managers and in reviewing documents that they have compiled, root cause technical management issues are
identified. These include ownership and accountability, normalization of deviances, critical thinking failure,
decentralized authority, and managing organizational complexity. The most prominent issue lies in integrating
systems. It encompasses the variety of a project’s components, from design to external operating environment,
making reintegration from compartmentalization by necessity, a continuous effort throughout the life cycle. Specific
integration processes affect project development at each level and by definition narrow future decision options, so
this process requires highly effective communication networks. These communications networks would be utilizing
the T-Model to create a seamless design process to address both ownership and authority issues. Risk management
also integrates the information from differentiated processes to evaluate and forecast future performance using the
Risk Matrix and PRA. These considerations are investigated within the context of life cycle management. Using the
information obtained in collaboration with Marshall Space Flight Center we link past lessons learned to current
management research. Analyzing the past projects leads to an understanding of research and development
management techniques that identify specific areas of improvement and ways of changing the management to affect
the overall performance of the end project. The organizational learning from NASA-MSFC historic analysis will
provide greater insight into efficient use of resources and improved technical management.

INTRODUCTION

the project. Much can be learned from the
development phase of previous NASA programs.
Increasing the efficiency of large scale aerospace
Organizational learning is the transferring of
projects requires an internal analysis of the
knowledge from one project and applying that
management processes that are currently being
knowledge in subsequent projects. Technology
utilized. NASA projects often encounter high risktransfer is generally well documented. However, the
reward scenarios that make efficiency even more
transfer of technology management knowledge is
paramount but ever more difficult as well. Efficiency
generally less well documented. At Marshall Space
not only reduces the engineering development and
Flight Center (MSFC), NASA has developed
production schedule and cost, but it encourages
innovative approaches to organizational learning and
innovation when there is a continuing demand for
the transfer of knowledge from past programs to
improvement in processes. Considering the current
current programs. The result is improvements in
resource constrained environment, it is important to
development processes and efficiency.
make space missions as affordable as possible. To
At NASA-MSFC the innovative approach to
illustrate the nature of this challenge, during the
organizational learning and the transfer of technology
Space
Shuttle
Main
Engine
development,
management knowledge includes the retention of
approximately 70% of the cost was due to problems
retired senior managers as expert resources. These
encountered subsequent to the initial design phase of
managers are then employed on a part-time or
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temporary contract basis and utilized in the
professional development of new entry-level NASA
engineers. In this investigation J.C. Blair, R.S. Ryan
and L.A. Schutzenhofer were interviewed. These
individuals served in positions including director and
assistant director of the Structures and Dynamics
Laboratory at NASA-MSFC. Their combined
experience in design and test activity includes Saturn
I, Saturn IB, Saturn Apollo, Skylab, Space Shuttle,
Spacelab, Hubble Space Telescope, Chandra, X-33,
and the International Space Station. Of the numerous
lessons learned, several critical issues were identified
for this investigation. These included the problem of
critical thinking failure and the need for
decentralization, achieving integration through both
formal and informal means, and lessons learned in
the management of organizational complexity. These
issues are central to the space exploration challenge,
which is to “conceive, design, build and operate,
safely, high performance, high power density, highly
interactive space systems at reasonable cost and
schedule efficiency”1.

CRITICAL THINKING FAILURE AND THE
NEED FOR DECENTRALIZATION
Critical thinking failure is a particularly insidious
problem because it is often so subtle that managers
can make decisions without realizing this failure has
occurred. This is a potential problem in many
professions and engineering management is no
exception. Human judgment and analysis will
ultimately be what moves the project forward.
Requirements documentation should give direction
and convey the overall technical performance
objectives (or targets) that are to be reached but
should not be unnecessarily over specified. Though
specificity acts as a risk deterrent, this can limit the
ingenuity which is paramount in being innovative; to
solving problems creatively and efficiently. Each
project requires necessary procedures and processes
but these should not be excessive. Blair, Ryan and
Schutzenhofer observed a trend within NASA where
the flexibility of the Von Braun era gradually gave
way
to
greater
formalization
and
even
bureaucratization. They concluded that the aim
should always be brevity and this is an underlining
theme of every process; to create as little
unwarranted restrictions as possible to leave room for
appropriate creativity. Creativity is central to
innovation. It is also partially critical thinking and
this is inherently necessary in devising new ways of
looking at existing processes and efficient ways of
solving problems as they arise.

To illustrate this issue, the Silicon Nitride ball
bearings, or SiNi bearings, which were used in all of
the Space Shuttle turbopumps were initially created
under an eminent project cancelation threat. The
designated team was unable to solve the design
problem. However, an engineer who was not directly
involved in the design effort came up with the
innovative concept, then used various demonstrations
to convince management, and created a solution that
was ultimately adopted. Thus, the planned steps
should be taken in solving a problem, such as
forming a designated team to work on the solution.
However, if the organization is operating under the
Von Braun era assumptions of an organic structure
and there exists sound interaction between teams,
then the solution can come from many different
sources, meaning that the designated team formation
is just the first step in the multi-faceted process2.
Robert Ryan observed that no specialized team
should be isolated and the teams must be openminded to other’s inputs which could potentially be
presenting the solution. As a solution is sought for a
problem, all options must be explored in a similar
logical fashion. Even if one option looks appropriate,
the process must not stop there but investigate all
alternatives. It is easy to fall into the “eureka” trap
where the process stops due to an attractive initial
solution3. This in commonly known as satisficing.
If deviations are ignored and are not critically
analyzed, then the problems which should have been
anticipated will have larger negative impacts
downstream. To illustrate this issue, during the
Saturn IV project, there was an undesirable side
effect of the engine gimbaling actuators interacting
with each other, jeopardizing their ability to control
the vehicle. However, management was skeptical of
the problem’s existence3. If the project managers do
not accept the team’s input, it will create an
environment where performance deviations are
ignored to evade ostracizing by denial from the
superiors. An example of where this principle was
applied effectively was during the Jupiter program.
Following a launch failure, in order to deal with
propellant sloshing in the second Jupiter launch, the
team used one engineer’s experience from his youth
on his farm moving water wagons to construct
floating containers. These were later adapted to
create baffles and eventually resulted in reducing the
total weight. The solution was creative and was made
possible by an organizational culture that encouraged
critical thinking in the form of “thinking outside the
box.” This also illustrates an organizational culture of
decentralization, ownership and accountability.
Another dimension of critical thinking failure is
perhaps even more profound. This is the actual
dismissal of data, sometimes known as selective
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perception. To illustrate, in 1975, a high ignition
overpressure from the Space Shuttle’s solid rocket
motor was deemed acceptable, after running the test3.
The risk was underestimated, which caused the first
flight to experience a buckled tank and unexpected
vibrations, impacting the vehicle loads. The
corrective engineering design changes took 40 model
test runs, all of which the team could have anticipated
given the accurate data they had initially obtained.
Once more, though the main issue was deficient risk
management, it combined with perceptual dismissal
of data generated by the test, subsequently resulting
in a larger problem. In high performance requirement
and high cost projects the effects of critical thinking
failure can have very large consequences.
The history of NASA space projects offers
multiple examples of both well managed and poorly
managed test results. For example, one of the
anomalies that occurred with Space Shuttle STS-1
was shown during the initial launch test. The results
showed that some points on the wing were
experiencing 100% of the design load, versus 65%
predicted. What turned out to be accurate data was
initially dismissed as improperly placed stress gauges
and this caused a problem which could have
potentially delayed the program by as much as two
years. Though a timely solution was devised, it
caused a 5,000 pound payload loss. Once such a
large problem is identified, it becomes difficult to
meet the original technical performance objectives.
Normalization of deviances is one of the challenge
areas that projects can face. Due to the nature of a
project, tests can always have outlier results that may
reflect improper modeling of the test itself and this
desensitizes people from seeing such anomalies. This
necessitates a test design that is reliable, where its
limitations are understood so that the results it
produces always have meaningful implications. Not
all tests can emulate the desired conditions but then
the uncertainties must be identified based on
historical data or sound judgment.
To illustrate further, a model was created to
determine how a diffuser functioned on the Space
Shuttle Main Propulsion System, and it passed all the
tests. But in actual operation, it failed after several
hours because it could not stand up to vibrations
induced by the system as a whole. The results were
partly due to uncertainties and partly due to an
inadequate model which had more stress absorbent
gages than the actual system. The environmental
conditions that applied to the particular scenario had
to be replicated in a test. However, an EPA
regulation on insulations changed how the Shuttle
External Tank was insulated, but in the subsequent
test, the same high temperature and low pressure
conditions had not been replicated properly. This

resulted in a pop-corning of the insulation versus an
even coated layer. These problems all stemmed from
failing to prepare a test adequately and failing to
analyze the test results adequately.
Sometimes, the failures are simply due to lack of
knowledge in the field, such as the flow environment
on Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) which
initially caused failures of numerous components.
The solution required funding applied research on
computational fluid dynamics and waiting for the
research to generate more insight. The cost savings
were estimated to be hundreds of millions of dollars
but the time delay was the most serious cost. With
SSME development, there was considerable
technological uncertainty. This translated into high
costs and the necessity of innovating as research
progressed. The final result was that the SSME did
become the only reusable rocket engine approved for
human missions.

THE NEED FOR BOTH FORMAL AND
INFORMAL MODES OF INTEGRATION
One of the greatest challenges in a large scale
aerospace project is systems integration. In complex
projects integration is difficult to achieve because the
essential specialization or division of labor must also
be fully utilized. The resulting compartmentalization
is essential for component and subsystem design.
However, it is important to make sure that the
boundaries that are formed by compartmentalization
are not inhibitory and that there are organizational
modes of integration to traverse these artificial
boundaries4. One of the ways to facilitate integration
is to prioritize the overall project.
Technical
professionals are assigned to specific tasks associated
with specific components or subsystems. However,
larger periodic meetings of multiple teams can
facilitate a full understanding of the project in its
entirety. This helps to guard against suboptimization
in decision making.
Systems engineering governs the lifecycle of the
project while technical integration focuses on the
unity of the project. Most problems in large scale
aerospace projects have not arisen due to lack of
ability, but more as a result of systems engineering or
technical integration problems. The entire lifecycle is
marked with compartmentalization where there is
fragmentation into design function, disciplines and so
on. Then the subsystems must be integrated and the
requirements of each subsystem must be optimized
by giving up less essential requirements of each
subsystem in order to maximize the performance of
the entire system. These design interfaces, and the
complex interaction effects that are created, is the
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most pivotal part of the integration. There are
numerous ways in which each subsystem interacts
with other subsystems. Robert Ryan observed that in
NASA’s experience most of the downstream project
problems trace their roots to one of these interactions.
At NASA-MSFC the T-Model is used to
illustrate and combine the formal (structural) and
informal aspects of integration5. The T-Model has the
shape of the letter itself, which conveys the unity of
all the subsystems at the top level as well as the
relatively separate specialized subsystems. The
formal or top level integration depends on the project
managers who must optimize the overall project’s
technical performance, cost and schedule. If an
overemphasis is given to formal modes of
integration, then informal forms of integration may
suffer. Informal integration takes place between the
engineering teams in the form of personal interaction
across units, informal meetings, phone calls, or other
forms of electronic communication. Informality is
important because it is maximally adaptive and
flexible. More emphasis is given to formal modes of
integration but informal integration is often
underestimated and is usually thought of as an aspect
of the organizations’ culture. Blair and Ryan
observed that the lesson learned in NASA’a
experience is that the formal modes of integration are
necessary but not sufficient. Informal integration, as
an aspect of the organization’s culture, is important to
achieving systems integration.
To illustrate, during the Skylab program there
was a need to undergo extensive payload recovery
missions because of earlier failed integration of
manufacturing with the design engineers. The testing
for the auxiliary tunnel venting, precluded a sealed
end of the tunnel but during manufacturing the tunnel
was inadvertently sealed because of a crossfunctional integration failure with the structural
design team6. Such failure should not have occurred
by any standard if the requirements of the system
were properly communicated.
Blair, Ryan and Schutzenhofer3 observed that
because there are multiple requirements on multiple
levels, an individual functional requirement must
consider other functional requirements which are all
part of a subsystem. These in turn must maintain
compatibility with the parallel requirements of other
subsystems. This means that the process must be
repeated with each set of requirements, and balanced,
before the design can be finalized. As an example,
the design of a propulsion subsystem is broken down
further into various design functions. The
requirements for each team range from safety to
performance, encompassing for example, thrust to
weight balance and thrust to engine number ratio
which are two separate requirements but at the same

time, inexorably bound. When all of the elements of
the subsystem are integrated, they must then be
integrated into the entire system. This is where there
is the inevitable discovery of new interactions
involving the various subsystems that must be
addressed. This process of balancing is central to the
integration problem because the ideal environment
for each subsystem is generally unachievable. This is
why the combination of both formal modes of
integration and informal coordination are so
important.

LESSONS IN MANAGING COMPLEXITY
Every new compartmentalized subsystem adds a
complexity layer as well as further interface
requirement documents and interface control
documents which track and manage the subsystem.
Such documentation creates another but separate
need for subsystem management and once more, the
complexities increase. Complexity is defined here as
how various component interaction changes affect
the outcome. Just as integration complexity increases
with the level of compartmentalization, system
uncertainty inevitably increases with the level of
complexity. Blair, Ryan and Schutzenhofer7 observed
that in NASA’s experience, the test-fail-fix cycle
usually accounts for at least 70 percent of the
development cost. The test-fail-fix cycle includes the
preliminary testing which is commonly followed by
seemingly unforeseen failure in the system which
must then be corrected. This cycle typically repeats
enough times to expend three quarters of a
development budget. The problems are caused by the
high level of uncertainty which the engineering teams
are unable to reasonably predict in advance. High
uncertainties include the unforeseen results of
subsystem of component level interfaces as well as
sensitivities.
An example of this problem was clearly
observed in the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME)
developmental process which had 38 significant
corrections with a mean cost of $30 million7. Blair,
Ryan and Schutzenhofer believe that this process can
be significantly reduced by initial design decisions
that involve lower technological risk. In the original
fuel turbopump housing on the SSME, which when
redesigned, had half as many parts as the original,
with no welds. Thus, the redesign reduced
uncertainty. The design process can be improved if
probability density functions (PDF) and risk matrices
are utilized. This is essentially an estimated
quantification of technological risk. This approach
takes into account both demand factors and capability
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factors, mapping out potential interferences, or
potential failure regions.
The stage in the project lifecycle will
determine which options are available at that
particular point. Though every requirement must be
balanced throughout the project, the design decisions
that occur earlier will have great impact on decisions
that occur later in development. Lifecycle
considerations serve many purposes, including acting
as a test to the project’s requirements. Robert Ryan
observed that in NASA’s experience, most of the
design compromises must be made as early as
possible because if the problems are temporarily
ignored, the solutions will still have to be made later
at greater expense or more severe consequences.
A simple example of the role of the project life
cycle can be seen in the design decisions related to
the problem of wind bias during launch when
contrasting the Saturn V with the Space Shuttle. In
both programs the wind bias problem was taken into
consideration during the initial design process and
thus affected original design decisions3. There were
few options in addressing the wind bias problem and
each option had its own consequences. Once early
design decisions were made to accommodate wind
bias, subsequent design decisions were affected. If
the wind bias had been accounted for by an annual
wind speed mean, then the design would be required
to withstand the large deviation from the mean, but if
the wind bias were measured the day of launch, then
the design could be adjusted accordingly. Utilizing
the day of measurement though, increased cost and
operational complexity. The Saturn V utilized a
more robust design to accommodate the wind speed
problem. However, the Space Shuttle required actual
day-of-launch wind biasing, though monthly mean
wind bias was initially planned. This was a less
robust approach but allowed other design
compromises to occur. Thus, every decision must not
only consider the system as an entirety but must
anticipate downstream consequences for cost,
schedule and technical performance.
The Law of Unintended Consequences states that
any and every change will produce a change on the
whole system, all of which cannot be calculated3.
This requires technical managers to consider all the
possible scenarios and to assign objective
probabilities where possible, and subjective
probabilities where there is no known data. To
illustrate this, the NASA Large Tethered Satellite
System missions were cancelled due to two failures.
The first Tethered Satellite was unable to complete
the mission due to an incidental bolt change out that
jammed one of the mechanisms. This mission failure
was based on human error. Every change must be
verified but in this case there was no verification.

The test was not completed and this resulted in
system failure. In this case the scenario was not
considered, no probability to this event was assigned,
and a necessary test was not conducted. In the
second Tethered Satellite mission the satellite was
lost and the concept was abandoned. However, the
opportunity was lost due to circumstances that
perhaps could have been anticipated from the start.
Again, there was inadequate development of possible
scenarios without the assignment of probabilities.
There was no subsequent testing and design changes.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, aerospace projects face unique
technical challenges due to the scale, complexity, and
the pioneering of new technologies in these projects.
They also provide an opportunity for the
development of new technology management
knowledge and the transfer of that knowledge
throughout the industry. As J. C. Blair, R. S. Ryan
and L. A. Schutzenhofer observed, much can be
learned about technology management from the
NASA experience. At Marshall Space Flight Center,
NASA has developed innovative approaches to
organizational learning and the transfer of knowledge
from past programs to current programs. This
knowledge has applicability not only within NASA
and the aerospace industry, but for large scale
engineering projects in general.

5 of 6

REFERENCES
1.
2.

3.

4.

NASA, System Engineering Handbook, 2nd
ed., MSFC-HDBK-1912A, MSFC, 1994.
Ward, R.J., Dr. Space: The Life of Wernher
von Braun, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 2005.
Blair, J.C., Ryan, R.S., and Schutzenhofer,
L.A., Lessons Learned in Engineering,
NASA/CR-2011 -216468, 2011a.
Sherman, J.D. and Rhoades, R.G., Cycle
Time Reduction in Defense Acquisition,
Research-Technology Management, 53, (5),
2010, 46-54.

5.

Blair, J.C., Ryan, R.S., Schutzenhofer, L.A.
and Humphries, W.R., Launch Vehicle
Design
Process:
Characterization,
Technical Integration, and Lessons Learned,
NASA/TP-2001 -210992, 2001.

6.

Lundin, B.T., NASA Investigation Board
Report on the Initial Flight Anomalies of
Skylab
1
on
May
14,
1973,
http://klabs.org/richcontent/Reports/Failure_
Reports/Skylab/Skylab_Report.htm, 1973.
Blair, J.C., Ryan, R.S., and Schutzenhofer,
L.A., Engineering the System and Technical
Integration,
NASA/CR-2011
-216472,
2011b.

7.

6 of 6

